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ABSTRACT
As small satellites continue to proof capable of producing useful scientific data and supporting commercial
applications their typical safe orbit/short life span missions are replaced by longer duration missions at harsher
orbits. Radiation effects concerns become more serious and steps need to be taken toward improving the reliability
of the spacecraft’s electronics. Thus, there is a need for high reliability computing engines capable of surviving this
new type of mission. The use of qualified radiation hardened parts is generally too expensive for this new type of
missions. Less expensive alternatives have focused on designing computing engines using radiation effects
mitigation approaches at the architectural level (e.g redundancy, testing, failsafe mechanisms, etc). IDEAS-TEK has
taken the approach of designing a custom radiation hardened ASIC using the same techniques that high-end
radiation hardened microelectronics is designed with, with the exception of high end costly tools and processes. This
paper presents SHARP- a 32-bit RISC processor being developed under sponsorship of AFRL as a radiation
hardened ASIC at 180nm technology node. SHARP prototypes (ASICs and equivalent soft-cores FPGA
implementations) are expected to be available early 2018.
devices is due to the lack of qualification (QML-V) as
well as the microprocessor architecture (low cost or free
licenses). IDEAS-TEK has taken this approach to
develop a Radiation Hardened 32-bit RISC processor
based on the OR1K architecture that will enable high
reliability onboard computing at a fraction of the cost of
traditional radiation hardened microelectronics. The
reduced cost is accomplished by 1) using a radiation
hardened standard cell library available to IDEAS-TEK
at no cost through a strategic partnership for this design
and others in the future, 2) using open source tools for
the ASIC front-end, 3) using a Multi-Project Wafer
(MPW) at the180nm node and 4) using an open source
microprocessor architecture. The result of this effort is
a 32-bit RISC processor ASIC labeled Space
HARdened Procesor or SHARP. At the core of
SHARP is an OpenRISC1000 (OR1K) open source
architecture CPU originally designed as a soft-core in
that it is malleable and can be configured in many
different ways to fit a particular application or
implementation target. This feature was pivotal in the
decision of using this architecture for SHARP and its
ASIC implementation.

BACKGROUND
As small satellites are deployed to harsher orbits and
longer missions are considered, concerns over radiation
effects on the spacecraft electronics become more
serious. However, radiation hardened qualified devices
are still generally too expensive for these missions. To
improve the spacecraft reliability, designers usually
take the approach of implementing mitigation
techniques at the architectural level at the cost of
increasing complexity and Size, Weight and Power
(SWaP).
Of particular concern are the computing engines in the
spacecraft. These are commonly at the center of
onboard critical systems, and are by nature less tolerant
to occasional data corruption due to Single Event
Upsets (SEUs) or reboots generated by system failures
or latchup mitigation approaches. The current CubeSat
and small satellite ecosystem comprises a wide variety
of processors, ranging from right out of the box
Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) devices [1] to
carefully screened parts in fault tolerant schemes that
include redundancy and a myriad of failsafe
mechanisms [2]. Recently, radiation hardened devices
have been made available at prices that are accessible to
CubeSat missions [3]. The inexpensiveness of these
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DMIPS/MHz, 1.8 CoreMark/MHz respectively [11, 5].
These results will be used to compare and evaluate
SHARP when the undergoing benchmarking efforts in
its soft-core form or FPGA implementation is
completed.

Comparison with other available solutions
There are other soft-core solutions that have been used
for high reliability, fault tolerant and space applications
such as [4-6]. Except for [5], none of these have yet
being ported into an ASIC to the best of our knowledge
– let along a radiation hardened ASIC. Additionally,
source code availability is either restricted or obscured
by using proprietary methods and there are costs
involved in licensing them. The OR1K architecture has
been ported before to ASICs with success at different
technology nodes and in different configurations and it
is freely distributed under a GNU Lesser General Public
License (LGPL) license.

Dhrystone

 Does not stress memory of newer systems.
 No floating-point.
 Much of the execution time is spent in basic library functions,
making it a measure of compiler performance.
Stanford

 Simple and modifiable.
 Includes neither compression nor hash tests

In terms of performance most of the soft-cores available
have comparable metrics. Although difficult to compare
in equal terms given the different – highly configurable
– features each architecture has, they are considered
roughly equivalent. In order to benchmark soft-cores, it
is important to choose near equivalent configurations
for each. The choice of configuration should also be
specific to the application for which the processor will
be used. For instance, if resources are limited in the
application, the benchmarks should be run on resource
optimized configurations of each processor.

CoreMark

 Has become the new standard because of flaws with Dhrystone.
 Tests a large variety of different integer and floating-point
operations.

 Complicated
Table 1:

SHARP ARCHITECTURE
SHARP includes serial communication channels
(UART, SPI, I2C) as well as GPIOs, a Floating-Point
Arithmetic Unit, and 128Kbits of onchip SRAM. A
simplified block diagram of the system is shown in
Figure 1.

Certain benchmark tests are known to be good
indicators of how a core will perform. The benchmarks
of interest for our application are separated into two
categories: Integer and Floating-Point. Integer tests are
a base requirement for benchmarks and will typically
include compression algorithms (Zip, JPEG, Huffman),
sorting algorithms (bubble, tree, quick), hash functions
(SHA256),
and
basic
arithmetic
operations
(multiplication, division). Some processors do not
include hardware floating-point support, so in these
cases floating-point tests will actually reflect integer
performance. Typical floating point tests include Fast
Fourier Transforms (FFT), linear algebra, and floating
point arithmetic operations (multiplication, division,
square roots)[7-8].

Figure 1. SHARP’s high level block diagram

The Dhrystone, Stanford, and CoreMark benchmark
suites are examples of standard benchmarking programs
that each has their benefits (See Table 1).

SHARP architecture was designed to be ported to an
ASIC, or an FPGA platform. Soft versions (RTL for
FPGA implementations) of SHARP have been
developed for Xilinx© and Microsemi© devices. The
soft-cores can be used for development and testing, or
as a starting point for custom designs targeting FPGAs.
A prototype version of one of these soft-cores (Xilinx©
on and IDEAS-TEK’s ARC board for CubeSats) is
manifested in the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology CubeSat scheduled for launch in 2018. The
main architecture features of each of these
instantiations of the SHARP core are listed in Table 2.

Previous efforts [9-10] have been made to benchmark
the soft-cores in [4-6] (namely, the RISC-V, Leon4 and
OpenRISC), however, these were performed on
different FPGAs and using very specific compiler
optimizations. This benchmark showed the RISC-V
Rocket performing at 2.32 CoreMark/MHz/Core on an
unknown FPGA, whereas OpenRISC 1200 performed
at 1.34 CoreMark/MHz/Core on a Xilinx ML501.
Additionally, Leon 4 and Leon 3 performance are listed
at 1.7 DMIPS/MHz, or 2.1 CoreMark/MHz and 1.4
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Details are described in this paper’s subsections
specific for each target.

Implementation Targets

SHARP’s main
differentiating
features

ASIC @
TJ 180nm

Xilinx’s
Virtex 5

Microsemi
RTG4

Freq. of operation

100MHz

150MHz

150MHz

Cache size

4KB (D/I)

8KB (D/I)

8KB (D/I)

On Chip Memory

128Kb

32KB

32KB

Spacewire Support

-

√

√

CAN Bus Support

-

√

√

Power
Consumption

low

high

medium

Another aspect of the design that was highly
customized to fulfill this requirement was the
bootloader (or startup block in Figure 1). This block
had to account for the different options it could extract
the boot code from, which varies depending on the
target implementation of the system. Both, memory and
bootloader considerations are described in the following
subsections.

Footprint

Small

Large

Large

Memory controller

Cost

Low

High

High

Radiation effects
mitigation

By design /
Process

Architectural
enhancement

By design /
Process

Thrusted

Potentially
yes

No

No

Radiation
hardiness level

>300K

No

>100K

In general terms, Static Random Access Memories
(SRAMs) are usually faster and more rugged to
radiation than Dynamic Random Access Memories
(DRAMs) although they are usually more expensive to
produce. Our literature search yielded several
manufacturers and memories of different densities that
could be used for our purposes. Table 3 shows a list of
the main options we found and took into consideration
while designing SHARP.

Table 2: SHARP’s main features on each of the
different implementation versions
It is desirable for the different instantiations of the
design to be swappable. This feature would allow a
team to develop a SHARP-based system using – for
instance – a version of SHARP instantiated in a
Xilinx® device for ease of testing and development to
later drop in the ASIC implementation for a more
resilient, low power implementation without having to
change the system’s schematic significantly. To this
end, SHARP is described using Verilog, making sure
that it is synthesizable on all the expected
implementation targets. In some cases, defines and
parameters are used to direct the synthesizer to use
primitives available on specific targets (e.g. memory
using BRAMs in Xilinx devices, vs. LSRAMs on
Microsemi’s RTG4 and standard cell library memory
components for the ASIC).
Additionally, the design requirement of each target
implementation being a drop in replacement for the
others drove some architectural features in the system.
In particular, the memory controller for the system had
to be compatible with commercially available suitable
memory chips to be used externally to the system, as
well as the memory structures available in each of the
different platforms the core can be ported on.
Obviously, a highly platform-dependent component
such as memory is instantiated differently on each of
the possible implementation targets, but the overall
system implementation behaves similarly on all targets.
Additionally, memory has to be protected against
Single Event Upsets (SEU), and this protection takes
different forms depending on the target platform.
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Size
(Mb)

Async/
Sync

TID –
KRad(Si)

ATMEL

16

Async

> 300

AT60142H

ATMEL

4

Async

>300

SMV512K32SP

TI

16

Async

>300

RC7C1024RHS

RedCat

1

Async

>300

RadStop QDRII SRAM

Cypress

-

Sync

> 300

RadStop Fast
Async SRAM

Cypress

-

Async

>300

3D2D512M16V
S1605

3D Plus

512

Sync

> 50

3DSR4M08CS1
647

3D Plus

4

Async

> 1000

HLXSR01632

Honeywell

16

Async

> 3,
>1000

16Mb Monolitic
SRAM

BAE

16

Async

>1000

Part

Mfr

AT68166H

Table 3: SRAM options for space use in
conjunction with the RH-OpenRISC
Synchronous SRAMs are generally more dense and
faster than their Asynchronous counterparts. On the
other hand, asynchronous memory controllers are
simpler than synchronous ones and more flexible in
terms of adapting to different memories. Since speed
and density are not critical factors for our application
(SHARP runs at 100MHz which is relatively slow for
fast synchronous memories and RAM of 4Mb is more
than adequate for the applications we are targeting)
asynchronous memories are preferred for SHARP. For
these reasons, SHARP includes a memory controller for
3
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CPU and peripherals logic. Figure 2 depicts the concept
implementation currently being worked out.

RH-SRAM
4Kx32
(DC)

Bootloader

OR1200 CPU &
PHERIPHERALS

After a reset, the bootloader module freezes the
microprocessor program counter and assumes control of
the Wishbone bus. It then accesses the non-volatile
memory to read its contents. Once data is received the
bootloader stores it into the microprocessor’s RAM.
Once all data is transferred, the bootloader releases the
Wishbone bus and the microprocessor assumes control
as the program counter starts to increment. For this
approach to work correctly, the bootloader has to be
aware of the processor’s RAM configuration (e.g.
external vs. internal RAM, reset vector address, etc.).
To this end, the bootloader includes a small set of
instructions used to drive the non-volatile memory
interface and the storing of information into particular
positions of the RAM. This code varies depending on
the target implementation. However, the overall
functionality remains the same, thus fulfilling the
design requirement of swappable implementation
targets.

5mm

50 pins

Figure 2. SHARP’s ASIC layout concept
SHARP’s RTL description was synthetized using open
source tools and custom scripts. The resulting output
netlist is provided to the back-end ASIC tools for place
and route. A SystemVerilog-based verification suite is
being developed to verify the correct functionality at
each step of the ASIC flow.
Tapeout is expected on Q3-2017, with first prototypes
available in Q1-2018.
FPGA IMPLEMENTATIONS
For SHARP’s softcore version we picked Xilinx’s
Virtex 5 and Microsemi’s RTG4 devices as target. The
Virtex 5 was chosen because there is a radiation
hardened part (XQR5VFX130) and a commercial
equivalent that would fit the requirement of being
interchangeable if necessary. This would allow a
relatively inexpensive test and development setup that
can be upgraded with a rad-hard part for flight. The
Microsemi’s RTG4 was selected as the lower power
alternative for a radiation hardened FPGA. As the
device is relatively new in the market, IDEAS-TEK
also saw a commercial opportunity in providing a softcore solution. Both instantiations of SHARP are
expected to be available (including an extensive
verification suite) in Q1-2018.

ASIC IMPLEMENTATION
The ASIC version is expected to operate @100MHz
and withstand 300Krad(Si) and be latchup immune.
This implementation was originally restricted to a 5mm
x 5mm die and roughly 200 I/Os. An initial estimation
of the system size, without including memory structures
(SRAM, Cache, etc) yielded an area 5.63mm2.
The ASIC implementation of SHARP is using a
radiation hardened by design standard cell library at
TowerJazz’s 180nm technology node. The library
currently only counts with a single block Asynchronous
Static RAM memory block that implements 128Kbits
(4K addresses and 32-bit words, plus 8-bits for EDAC).
Each one of these blocks is roughly 1950µ by 2520µ.
Given our 5mm by 5mm die restriction, SHARP can
only instantiate 3 of these memory cores besides the
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RH-SRAM
4Kx32
(RAM)
5mm

SHARP’s bootloader is built around a custom interface
to access an external (or internal) non-volatile memory
that stores the microprocessor’s program. In the case of
external non-volatile memories, the interface used
implements the SPI protocol. In the case of internal
non-volatile memory (for the RTG4 implementation), a
custom interface was developed.

RH-SRAM
4Kx32
(IC)

50 pins

asynchronous SRAM memory with a WishBone
interface to SHARP’s CPU. The internal SRAM on the
FPGA implementations are modeled to match the
controller’s interface, so that internal and external
SRAM can be treated as one. The core includes EDAC
encoding and decoding circuitry compatible with byte
addressable scheme implemented at the SHARP main
data bus.

For the soft-cores implementation, SHARP’s
architecture has been enhanced using well know single
event effects mitigation techniques such as Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR), Error Detection and
Correction (EDAC), CRC, scrubbing, and watchdog
4
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timer. Decisions on where to implement which
approach are based on an analysis of the architecture.
Each of the methods used are described in the following
subsections.

clock cycles of latency would have on the overall
system performance and 2) the complexity of adding
pipeline stages within the CPU internal organization.
The components identified are particularly deep into the
CPU structure and do not employ handshake
mechanisms to transfer data. Rather they rely solely
upon a deterministic data transfer mechanism. Adding
extra delays in these components will not only be a
complex task, but will have a greater impact on the
system performance than other components where data
transfer mechanisms account for extra delay. The
impact on the system’s overall performance was also
evaluated by how often such memory components are
accessed. Each of the four (4) components identified
are continuously accessed (read/write) throughout the
system’s operation. This continuous and frequent
access prohibits us from adding additional latency
under penalty of affecting the system’s performance.
However, continuous and frequent access to these
components means its contents are refreshed often. This
can be used as a naturally occurring memory scrubbing
mechanism that would significantly reduce the chances
of error accumulations (multiple bit errors happening in
a single word or datapath).

Watchdog timer
Timers are common peripherals in microprocessor
systems; they can be used for scheduling via
interruptions, for the generation of pulse width
modulated signals, etc. Commonly available timer
descriptions can be added on or modified to also serve
as a watchdog timer, implementing a mechanism to
reset the CPU in case a SEE sends the processor to an
unrecoverable state. This mitigation approach does not
have an impact on performance, and has minimal
impact in terms of logical resource use. The original
OR1K architecture does include a timer used for other
functions. Although this timer core could be used, it
was considered more convenient to implement a
separate core, outside of the CPU, whose only function
is to serve as a watchdog for the system. Figure 1 shows
the implementation of this alternative. The core used
for this task is a modified version of a core available at
OpenCores.org. When implementing this solution, two
options were considered: 1) make the core independent
(not connected to the CPU bus and use a generic I/O to
reset (pet) the timer, or 2) connect the core to the CPU
bus and use a memory mapped address to reset (pet) the
timer. The latter option was chosen for simplicity;
however we do not discard using the first solution
further down the road.

Each of the four (4) components identified have the
additional characteristic of being small in size. Both of
these factors suggest the use of simpler error correction
codes to mitigate the probability of upset bits in these
memory components propagating to the rest of the
system. Mitigation methods such as parity, cyclic
redundancy check (CRC) or error detection and
correction codes (EDAC), can be used.

SEE Mitigation on latency intolerant components

In the case of GPRs, EDAC is preferred in order to
always read a correct answer from these registers. No
write-back or scrubbing is necessary (which would add
latency) as data in these registers is usually short-lived
(meaning they are overwritten often).

The OpenRISC 1200 CPU (an implementation of the
OR1K architecture) has the following memory
components that are intolerant to latency: QMEM,
Instruction Cache (IC), Data Cache (DC) and the
CPU’s General Purpose Register (GPR). These are
depicted in the CPU block diagram in Figure 3.

Figure 3. High-level block diagram of the
OpenRISC 1200 and its SEE-susceptible memory
components.

In the case of the data and instruction caches, the user
could pick between EDAC and CRC. EDAC is more
costly in terms of logical resources, but will allow the
caches to always produce the correct data (by detecting
and correcting errors). CRC is less costly in terms of
logical resources, but could only signal the processor
when an error is detected, without being able to correct
it. However, the cache has mechanisms available to
refresh its contents on demand. The refreshing
mechanisms can be triggered when an error is
encountered, at a performance cost (i.e., the time that it
takes to refresh its contents). Thus in the case of the
caches, the user has a classical “resources vs.
performance” trade-off decision to make.

The components’ intolerance to latency classification
was decided based on 1) the impact that additional

Based on this analysis a solution using extended
Hamming code (single-error correcting and double-
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error detecting - SECDED) was implemented. Since the
core implementing the SECDED is dependent (in size)
on the memory it is protecting, three different cores that
include encoder and decoder parts were created to
protect the GPRs, QMEM, and IC/DC (see Figure 3).

approach), TMR has to be carefully implemented for it
to have a positive effect in the overall reliability of the
system [12]. The provisions available in the current
internal release of the soft-cores implements what is
known as localized TMRed. Other approaches should
be considered by the user depending on the complexity
and criticality of the system being designed.

In order to ensure that all memories would function
normally with no added latency, combinational logic
was used in each module. Also, no scrubbing was
implemented with the same goal of avoiding additional
latency. In the case of the cache memory blocks, an
error detection signal is being used to force the flushing
of the cache, effectively scrubbing any error.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the architecture of a 32-bit
radiation hardened processor for space applications that
will have both ASIC and FPGA implementations.
Radiation hardening is accomplished by design in the
ASIC and by using radiation hardened FPGA devices.
Additional architectural modifications were added to
improve the system resilience to SEE when
implemented in non-radhard platforms. SHARP is
expected to be available as early as Q1-2018.

SEE Mitigation on latency tolerant components
Data and instruction memories (RAM) are latency
tolerant components in the sense that a handshake is
used to access them, and extra latency can be tolerated
(See Figure 3). The on-chip RAM modules have two
particularities that set them apart from the memory
blocks that have already been protected by EDAC
(error detection and correction) codes. The first
particularity refers to their capability to handle
additional latency if necessary. These memory cores are
connected to the microprocessor systems through a bus
with handshake, meaning an additional clock cycle of
latency could be handled by the bus protocol. It would
obviously have an impact on the overall throughput and
performance of the system. The second particularity
relates to the on-chip RAM byte addressable feature. In
spite of having a 32-bit wide data bus, these memories
can be addressed byte by byte. This feature introduces
some complexity to the implementation of error
correction and detection codes. The difficulty lies in
being able to encode and decode the error correction
codes that are protecting a 32-bit wide word when only
a byte is being read out or written. Several alternatives
were researched to quantify their efficiency in terms of
performance and resource consumption for the case the
different FPGA targets considered. A proprietary
method was implemented to overcome the difficulty
described while reducing the impact in the
microprocessor’s performance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based on research sponsored by the Air
Force Research Laboratory under agreement number
FA9453-16-C-0413.
REFERENCES
1.

CubeSat Kit™ FM430 Flight Module Datasheet,
http://www.cubesatkit.com, last retrieved on
06/06/17

2.

D. Rudolph, C. Wilson, J. Stewart, et all,
“CHREC Space Processor”; 28th Annual
AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites,
August 2014.

3.

Vorago’s VA10820 Radiation Hardened ARM®
Cortex®-M0
MCU
Datasheet,
http://voragotech.com/products/VA10820,
last
retrieved on 06/06/2016

4.

AAC
Microtec’s
OpenRISC-FT,
http://forum.aacmicrotec.com/index.php/Openris
c-ft, last retrieved on 06/06/2017

5.

Cobham LEON4 Processor product description,
http://www.gaisler.com/index.php/products/proce
ssors/leon4, last retrieved 06/06/2017

6.

A. Waterman, K. Asanovic, “The RISC-V
Instruction Set Manual”, Version 2.2, May 2017,
https://riscv.org/specifications/, last retrieved on
06/06/2017

7.

Daniel Mattsson and Marcus
"Evaluation of Synthesizable
Master’s Thesis Computer
Engineering Program, Chalmers
Technology, Gothenburg 2004.

Triple Modular Redundancy
This approach was considered for peripherals attached
to SHARP’s central WishBone bus. The versions of
SHARP currently being tested do not include this
approach for any of the basic peripherals included in
the distribution. But the hooks and means to instantiate
a wishbone interface that supports TMRed peripherals
will be included in the final distribution for the user to
decide on its implementation in case of using
commercial devices which will be vulnerable to Single
Event Effects (SEE). Although an effective method to
deal with SEE (masking error in the most simple
Vera

6

Christensson;
CPU Cores”,
Science and
University of

31st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

8.

"CoreMark ® - Pro: CoreMark for HighPerformance
Processors."
EEMBC.
http://www.eembc.org/coremark/CoreMarkPro_intro.pdf, last retrieved on 06/06/2017

9.

Celio, Christopher, David A. Patterson, and Krste
Asanović. The Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine
(BOOM):
An
IndustryCompetitive,
Synthesizable, Parameterized RISC-V Processor.
Tech. no. UCB/EECS-2015-167.

10.

"OR1200 OpenRISC Processor." OpenCores. 11
Dec.
2012.
http://opencores.org/or1k/OR1200_OpenRISC_P
rocessor , last retrieved on 06/06/2017

11.

Cobham LEON3 Processor product description,
http://www.gaisler.com/index.php/products/proce
ssors/leon3, last retrieved 06/06/2017

12.

Melanie Berg, “New Developments in Error
Detection and Correction Strategies for Critical
Applications”. 2016 Single Event Effects (SEE)
Symposium and Military and Aerospace
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD)
Workshop; 23-26 May 2016; San Diego, CA;
United States

Vera

7

31st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

